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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Lucas Darnell Francke appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance and possession 
of paraphernalia.  Francke contends the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
The state charged Francke with possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp.8-9, 15-16, 57-58.)  Francke filed a motion 
to suppress, asserting there was no reasonable basis for the traffic stop because 
I.C. § 49-428(2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to trucks with trailer ball 
hitches.  (R., pp.90-98.)  The district court denied Francke’s motion.  (Tr., p.21, 
L.7 – p.24, L.14.)         
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Francke pled guilty to both possession 
charges, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.  
(R., pp.128-139.)  The court imposed a unified five-year sentence, with two years 
fixed, for possession of a controlled substance, but retained jurisdiction and 
“defer[red] pronouncing sentence” on the paraphernalia charge “until the rider 







 Francke states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Francke’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Francke failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 







The District Court Correctly Concluded Francke Was Not Entitled To 




Francke “asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress,” which motion was based on Francke’s assertion that “I.C. § 49-428(2) 
is void for vagueness.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  Application of the relevant legal 
standards shows the district court correctly concluded otherwise and affirmed 
Francke’s motion to suppress on this basis.       
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court 
reviews it de novo.  State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003).  The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly show the invalidity of the 
statute.  Id.  The appellate court is obligated to seek a construction of a statute 




C. Francke Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Conclusion That  
Francke Was Not Entitled To Suppression Because I.C. § 49-428(2) Is Not 
Unconstitutionally Vague 
 
 If an officer has reasonable articulable suspicion to believe a car is being 
driven in violation of the motor vehicle code, the officer may conduct a traffic 
stop.  Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998).  In this 
case, Officer Pickard conducted a traffic stop on Francke based on reasonable 
suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-428(2).  (See R., pp.93-94, 104.)  That statute 
provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very license plate shall at all times . . . be in a 
place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign 
materials and in a condition to be clearly legible . . ..”  At the suppression 
hearing, the parties stipulated that “the trailer ball hitch” on the truck in which 
Francke was riding “blocked a portion of the license plate” such that Officer 
Pickard could not read the entire plate when travelling behind the truck.  (Tr., p.7, 
L.9 – p.9, L.6.; see also R., pp.124-125 (affidavit filed in support of motion to 
suppress).)  Francke argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied because it does not “allow for . . . citizens of ordinary intelligence to 
understand what is prohibited.”  (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-12.)  The district court rejected 
this argument, explaining that the words “clearly visible,” as used in I.C. § 49-
428(2), have a “common meaning that can be understood.”1  (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-
13.)  As such, the district court denied Francke’s request for suppression.  (Tr., 
p.24, Ls.13-14.) 
                                            
1 The district court agreed with Francke’s alternative argument that the trailer ball 
hitch would not constitute “foreign material” for purposes of I.C. § 49-428(2).  (Tr., 
p.22, Ls.19-23.)   
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 On appeal, Francke states he is “[m]indful of the plain language of Section 
49-428(2) and its mandate that every license plate shall at all times be ‘clearly 
visible,’” but nevertheless asserts “the statute is unconstitutionally vague as 
applied to his conduct” because that is what he argued in support of his motion.  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.11.)  Francke does not, however, explain why this is so.  
Instead, he effectively concedes it is not.  Having failed to present any actual 
argument supporting his constitutional argument, this Court should decline to 
consider it.  See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) 
(quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting 
an issue will not be considered if “either authority or argument is lacking” and 
declining to consider appellant’s claim because he failed to “provide[] a single 
authority or legal proposition to support his argument”).                 
 Even if the Court considers the merits of Francke’s “argument,” it fails for 
two reasons.  First, Francke would not be entitled to suppression under the 
Fourth Amendment based on a traffic stop made in violation of a state statute.  
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008).   
Second, I.C. § 49-428(2) is not unconstitutionally vague.  The void-for-
vagueness doctrine rests upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.  Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 
U.S. 489 (1982); State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003).  
 
 6 
“A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people 
of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to 
establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must 
enforce the statute.”  State v. Fluewelling, 150 Idaho 576, 578, 249 P.3d 375, 
377 (2011) (quoting Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132).  “It has long been 
held that a statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical 
interpretation can be given the statute.”  State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 
P.3d 702, 704 (2001).  There is a strong presumption of constitutionality and the 
party challenging the statute must clearly show the invalidity of the statute.  
Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990); State v. 
Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 447, 807 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Ct. App. 1991).    
Section 49-428(2)’s requirement that a license plate be “clearly visible” at 
all times is not vague.  That Francke may believe there should be an exception 
for trailer ball hitches does not mean the words in the statute “fail[] to give 
adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it 
prescribes,” it just means that he disagrees with the statute’s application to 
vehicles with trailer ball hitches.  Disagreement with the application of a statute to 
a particular set of circumstances falls far short of demonstrating the statute is 
vague.  The district court correctly concluded the words “clearly visible,” as used 
in I.C. § 49-428(2), have “a common meaning that can be understood.”  (Tr., 






 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Francke’s conditional guilty pleas to possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of paraphernalia. 
 DATED this 9th day of November, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Jessica M. Lorello  ___ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of November, 2016, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BEN P. McGREEVY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




      __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello_____ 
      JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JML/dd 
 
